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USING DEVICE MOVEMENT FOR MULTI-FACTOR
COMPUTING DEVICE AUTHENTICATION

Multi-factor computing device authentication involves a user providing information in
addition to their username and password in order to access a service. Common examples today
include entering a temporary PIN code, answering a personal question, or touching a security key
that is installed locally on a computing device. The technology described in this document
enables a user to physically move their computing device in a particular pattern to verify their
presence, as part of a secure multi-factor computing device authentication process.

KEY GENERATION
To implement such a technology, a Movement Service could be developed and loaded
into local memory on a mobile computing device. The Movement Service may be part of the
operating system of the computing device, and may encode movement into an encrypted
movement key. The encrypted movement key may be a hash of various signals that the
computing device captures while the user is moving the computing device in a particular pattern
during an authentication process. The various signals that form the basis for an encrypted
movement key may include (i) duration of the movement, (ii) speed of the movement, (iii)
acceleration during the movement, (iv) orientation of the computing device during the
movement, (v) pressure of user fingers on the computing device during the movement, (vi)
proximity of the computing device to the user during the movement, (vii) device connectivity
characteristics such as WIFI and data connection, and (viii) device characteristics, such as phone
model and operating system version.
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FIRST IMPLEMENTATION
A user may be prompted during enrollment for a multi-factor authentication process to
imagine a particular movement/gesture that is secret to the user, and then to move their mobile
computing device in the intended manner responsive to a computing device prompt. The mobile
computing device may record any combination of the above described sensor signals and device
characteristics (and potentially other sensor signals and device characteristics) during the
movement, and the mobile computing device can store those characteristics as an encrypted
movement key on the computing device.
Upon the user attempting to access a service that requires multi-factor computing device
authentication, such a service can request that the user verify their authenticity by reproducing
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the movement that the user provided during the enrollment process. In response, the user can
move the computing device in the same manner that the user performed during the enrollment
process, in order to verify that the individual attempting to access the service is the actual user
and not an unauthorized individual. This movement will be referenced in this document as an
authentication gesture, and can include a single movement or multiple different types of
movements over a period of time. The Movement Service on the phone may encode movements
recorded by the sensors of the computing device after the user is prompted to provide an
authentication gesture, and the computing device can compare those encoded movements to the
stored encrypted movement key that was generated during enrollment. If the data generated
during entry of the authentication gesture matches the encrypted movement key, the computing
device can provide a “PASS” signal to the requesting service by way of the Movement Service.
If the encoded movements do not match the encrypted movement key, the user may be prompted
to provide the authentication gesture another time. After some N amount of failed attempts to
provide a valid authentication gesture, the Movement Service may send a “FAIL” signal back to
the requesting service.

SECOND IMPLEMENTATION
A second implementation allows for non-permanent movement verification to be
specified by the requesting service. For example, a user may attempt to log into their bank’s web
service. The bank’s web service could verify the authenticity of the user with a multi-factor
computing device authentication process that relies on user entry of an authentication gesture
similar to that provided above. But, instead of the user having to perform an authentication
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gesture that the user previously specified during an enrollment process, the bank web service
could specify the authentication gesture for the user to perform.
As an example, a user may visit a web service for the bank and enter his username and
password into the appropriate fields. After doing so, the bank web service may ask the user to
perform the following sequence of movements: (1) Flip the phone upside down for 1 second, (2)
Shake the phone gently for 3 seconds, and (3) Rotate the phone right side up. The Movement
Service on the mobile computing device may encode signals generated by sensors on the
computing device during entry of the authentication gesture in the manner described above with
a hash value that forms the encrypted movement key. The Movement Service may then compare
the encrypted movement key against a library of movement keys that represent different types of
authentication gestures. A result of the comparison process may be passed back to the bank’s
web service. For example, the computing device may indicate whether the user-entered
authentication gesture matches the authentication gesture specified by the web service, by
providing either a “PASS” or “FAIL” signal to the bank web service.

THIRD IMPLEMENTATION
A third implementation enables users to encode multiple authentication gestures during
enrollment. In this implementation, the user may perform multiple iterations of the enrollment
process and may specify a different authentication gesture during each iteration, with the
Movement Process generating a different encrypted movement key during each iteration. A
service may specify the type of authentication gesture that the user has to perform to access the
service, or may simply request that the user perform any authentication gestures that the user
specified during enrollment. For example, the Movement Service can select an authentication
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gesture randomly from the multiple authentication gestures that the user previously specified, or
the Movement Service can select the authentication gesture that the user must perform based on
a context of the computing device (e.g., a location of the computing device or a time of the day).
As an example, a user may attempt to log into his bank’s web service. The web service
may decide to verify that the user is who he says that he is using a multi-factor computing device
authentication process that requires user entry of an authentication gesture, and can relay a
request to the Movement Service to perform the authentication process. The Movement Service
may analyze a context of the computing device, recognize that the device is on a WIFI network
that corresponds to a home of the user, and therefore may prompt the user to provide a “Lite”
authentication gesture. During a previous enrollment process, the user may have been prompted
to perform a “Lite” authentication gesture and may have performed a simple shake of the phone
for 2 seconds. As such, the user may simply shake the phone for 2 seconds, the Movement
Service may determine that this movement matches the “Lite” authentication gesture that the
user previously entered, and the Movement Service may send a PASS signal to the bank web
service.
The user may later attempt to log into the same bank web service, but this time from a
friend’s house. The Movement Service may recognize that the device is on an unfamiliar WIFI
network and therefore may prompt the user to perform a “Complex” movement that the user
previously specified during an enrollment process. The “Complex” movement may involve
more motions and/or a longer duration of each movement.
An advantage of allowing users to enter multiple verification movements is that a
computing device can prompt a user to provide contextually-relevant authentication gestures
depending on the situation. Users may not be annoyed with entering complex authentication
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gestures when accessing a service in environments that pose less threat of attack by a malicious
entity, but may have the additional security and peace of mind that comes with having to provide
a complex movement sequence when in an environment that poses a greater threat of attack by a
malicious entity.

CONCLUSIONS
An interesting aspect of this technology is that authentication can require physical control
of the computing device. It would be difficult for a malicious individual to hack a series of
movements, given the significant number of data points that are collected by device sensors
during user entry of a verification gesture. Consider, for example, an authentication gesture that
lasts 5 seconds and involves 4 different position changes. The number of data points collected
by the Movement Service during the authentication movement would be based on the number of
sensors that capture the movement, multiplied by a rate at which the Movement Service is
capturing data. The number of data points could be in the hundreds of thousands, rendering
brute-force attacks difficult.
A comparable example in the offline world would be attempting to forge a handwritten
signature, but being required to do so at the same speed at which the signature was originally
written, using the same pen pressure and stroke, and using the same pen angles and orientation of
the pen with respect to the user. An advantage of having physical control over the device into
which an authentication gesture must be specified is that a hack or leak of movement data could
be remedied fairly easily by a user simply creating a new authentication gesture. In contrast, a
data leak that exposes answers to personal history questions can compromise such information
forever.
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Another advantage of having physical movement encoded and hashed locally on a mobile
computing device is that it avoids an attack vector in which a malicious entity attempts to
intercept a PIN code that is emailed or texted to a mobile number. Another advantage of the
approaches described in this document is that they can provide reduced latency for a user, which
provides a faster and more streamlined approach to multi-factor authentication. For example,
consider the time difference between a user waiting for a PIN to be emailed or texted to the user
and then manually entered into the service application, in distinction to a user being able to
immediately move their device in a specific pattern.
Further to the descriptions above, a user may be provided with controls allowing the user
to make an election as to both if and when a computing device would record movement of the
computing device. For example, a user may need to enroll in a movement verification process
before any service is able to ask the user to perform an authentication gesture as its form of
multi-factor device authentication. A computing device may not analyze movement of a
computing device during an authentication process unless a user has previously requested that an
authentication gesture be an option for multi-factor authentication.
As described above, the movement data and various other signals may be stored on the
computing device as a hash value, such that the original movement data cannot be recovered
from the hash, and movement and context that relate to the authentication gesture cannot be
deciphered even were the hash value to be accessed. In summary, the system may be designed
so that the user has control over what information is collected about the user, how that
information is used, and what information is provided to the user.
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ABSTRACT
A mobile computing device such as a smartphone may allow a user to confirm their
identity during an authentication process by moving their phone according to a specified
authentication gesture. The authentication gesture may be one that the user previously specified
during an enrollment process and may otherwise be secret (e.g., the computing device may
prompt the user to “Move the phone according to your secret authentication gesture”). In
another example, the computing device may specify a type of authentication gesture for the user
to perform (e.g., the computing device may prompt the user to “Move the phone in a star
shape”). A user may provide an authentication gesture in addition to a username and a password
in a multi-factor authentication scheme.
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